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Abstract. A token-based model for fraud detection and prevention in information systems is
presented. Due to the high false alarm rates experienced in currenl fraud detection systems,
this model has the goal of saving overall system losses. The system raises an alann only when
the token associated with an entity reaches a negative value. It ranks acLions (or transactions)
by their suspicion level. The most sll:>picious action will have the lowest token value. This

model is more appropria[C in evaluating commercial fraud detection and prevention systems
by conducting experiments on three types of behavior patterns, intentional cheating, sman

repeated cheating, and unintended carelessness. The results show that our model can catch
certain repetitive small-eost fraudulent actions which may escape other models. It has a low
rate of false alarms and achieves almost optimal decision-making. This mechanism can be
easily adopted by current fraud detection and prevention systems.

1. Introduction
Fraud is a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair or
unlawful gain [1], or as an intentional perversion of truth in order to induce another to
part with something of value or to surrender a legal right [2]. Although cryptographic
techniques make fraud more difficult, they cannot eliminate it. As more and more
people use online transactions and rely on telecommunications, there has been an
increasing interest in developing fraud management engines. For e-commerce, fraud
affects less than 2% of consumers; however, it is expected to grow rapidly [3].
Several factors make fraud detection and prevention challenging. First,
detection methods effective for one specific domain are high likely less effective for
others [4]. Second, for fraudsters and legitimate clients, their behavior patterns
change over time. The detection system needs to adapt to new fraud patterns, and it
should also recognize new legitimate behaviors. Third, huge volume of involved
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infonnalion makes it hard to analyze them lhoroughly. Fraud needs to be detected in
real time to avoid more losses, but overwhelming amount of datu makes real-time
discovery more difficult. Moreover, the fraud to legitimate ratio is miniscule,
sometimes as low as 0.2%. False alarms are unavoidable because most systems can
only correctly classify 70% to 80% instances. If every instance is classified as
legitimate, in fraud detection area, we could correctly classify 90% instances or even
higher. However, this is not the function of fraud detection and prevention. It is
difficult to decrease false alarms and also catch more fraud.
Table 1 lists the results from a fraud detection engine. Several criteria have
been used in evaluating fraud detection engines. In [5, 6, 7J researchers use Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROC). A ROC graph shows the relationship between True
Positive (TP) rate and False Positive (FP) rate. A classifier is defined by its ROC for a
dataset, independent of class distribution. Rosset et at. [8] use accuracy and fraud
coverage as criteria. Accuracy is the number of dctected fraud over the total number
of classified fraud. Fraud Coverage is the number of detected fraud over the true
number of fraud. It is impossible to know precisely the number of frauds.
Table 1. Fraud Detection Confusion Matrix
Fraud

Legitimate

Alarm

Correct

False alarm

No-alann

Missed

Correct

The false alarm rate and the fraud detection rate are more appropriate criteria.
The false alann rate is the percentage of false alarm in alarm set. The fraud detection
rate is the loss by detected fraud over the total loss due to fraud. These two can not be

obtained in real time. They may be calculated monthly or weekly in financial area in
order to evaluate the performance of fraud detection and prevcntion engines. For
other applications, each compromised state can be associated with a cost, even though
patterns of fraud leading to that compromised state are unknown.
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False alanns cause the loss of investigalors' efforts and a potential loss of
clients. A missed fraud has obvious costs. The loss caused by both is called a s)'srem
error cost. A good fraud detection engine should reduce the system error cost.
We propose a loken-based model for fraud detection and prevenlion.
Experimenls show that it can facilitate the near optimal decision making in alarm
generation, and provides a more appropriate metric in evaluating fraud management
systems. Proposed design is similar to the earlier proposals [9, 10) in some respects. It
has additional advantages of being able to detect the repetitive small-amount frauds
that are not caught by the earlier designs and has a lower false alarm rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Seclion 2 introduces a state-ofan fraud detection system, followed by token-based fraud detection models in Section
3. Seclion 4 identifies three lypes of user behavior. Section 5 describes the
experiments and their results. Conclusion is given in Section 6.

2. A State-of-the-Art Fraud Detection System
Fraud

detection

and

prevention

systems

arc

widely

uscd

III

lelecommunications [11), online transaction processing [12, 13), and intrusion
detection in computers or networks [14, IS]. These systems share the feature that
actions are recorded. Based on these recorded data, methods such as data mining [10),
machine learning [9, 11) can be applied for fraud detection. Preprocessing is done to
select and format the data before using them. Preprocessing can hide private or
sensitive infonnation visible in the raw data.
Currently, most fraud detection and prevention systems consist of a profiling
engine and a decision-making component.
Profiling Engine. A profiling engine normally involves three major subcomponents:
rule generation, user profiling, and online detection. Rule generation subcomponent
[8, 10, 16, 17) mines massive amounts of database records to get association rules and
estimates accuracies of these rules. Both user-level and behavior-level information
can be used in mining. Normally, a large volume of fraud rules will be generated.
In the user profiling subcomponent, the first step is to select variables that can
be used to characterize the range of normal behaviors. The variables should be
sensitive to abnormalities and comparable over time. If a fraud happens, at least one
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of the patterns for these variables should show an abnormality. The variables can be
identified in a number of ways. One approach is to derive them from the fraud rule
generation process. The variables will be a subset of those used in the rule set.
Pattern nonnalization follows variable selection and involves only legitimate
behavior data. Patterns inelude group patlerns and individual patterns. Group pattern
lIol7lwlizatioll groups clients with similar backgrounds within the period of

investigation. It is possible that clients are moved from one group to another over
time.

Patterns with obvious abnormalities arc eliminated from the group pattern

normalization.
The nonnalizalion process makes a normal distribution of the data for a
variable during a short period, such as per twenty four hours. These variable patterns
are stored as the user profile histories and will be retrieved for reference during online
fraud detection. Another set of data is called current use behavior patterns. It is
similar to the previous set, ex.cept that there is no elimination of data. New users have
their profiles initiated based on their expected behaviors. For example, it can be based
on their user group classification.
The third subcomponent of a profiling engine is onlille detectioll. When a new
action or transaction starts, the detection engine retrieves the related rules from the
llser profiling subcomponent for the user running the action or transaction. It may
need to retrieve user's profile history and his or her current behavior patterns. Each
rule is checked. If the action or transaction does not match any fraud rule, the output
is zero. Othenvise, the maximum accuracy of the rules that match this action or
transaction can be used as the output. This is called fraud indicator and denoted "PI".
Decision-making Component. Based on the fraud indicator from the profiling
engine, the decision-making component decides if an alarm needs to be generated or
not, depending on its decision algorithm. For example, in a cost-based model, an
alann is generated only when the loss from an action or transaction is higher than the
cost of investigation.
3. Token-based Fraud Detection Models
The token-based models combine both absolute and differential fraud
analysis. Absolute analysis uses predefined and static domain-specific rules for fraud
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detection. If an action or a transaction matches any of these rules, the system can havc
100% confidence that a fraud has happened. For example, in the telecommunications
domain, detecting a call collision means that phone is cloned. Differential lll1aly.',is
uses generated association rules as described in Section 2. Each rule may have
different thresholds for different users. This type of analysis is attractive because it is
domain-independent. It can be used to find new fraud patterns. The rule generation
subcomponent operates continuously to generate or update rules from newly found
frauds and disputable cases, thus producing new sets of rules and their accuracies.
The user profiling subcomponent updates the currenl user behavior patterns and userlevel information. The online detection rules are dynamically updated either
periodically, or when the rules generated by the rule generation subcomponent have
reached a certain predefined level of change defined by the administration. Thus, the
token-based model can be easily adopted by current fraud detection and prevention
systems. The online detection will adapt rapidly as the other two subcomponents keep
adjusting to new patterns.
At the beginning, a system administrator assigns tokens for each participating
user. The total number of tokens is system-dependent. The output PI from a profiling
engine is used by the decisionwmaking component. FI can be interpreted as the
estimate of the probability of fraud given by the profiling engine.
The risk of loss R can be defined as
R = FI - f (0 < f < 50%)
where r is called risk adjustment parameter. The higher the sensitivity of a
transaction, the lower the risk adjustment parameter. For example, exchanging a good
of value $10,000 has higher risk than exchanging a good of value $1 under the same
procedure. So the first transaction will have a lower r to make the risk of loss R
higher. As another example, intrusion puts the computer system into a higher risk
state than Denial of Service, so a low r can make the fjrst action have a higher risk of
loss.
Suppose that the expected total benefit from a transaction is B. The token
value for the user committing this transaction is updated by the risk of loss R
associated with this transaction:
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token =

lOken-bXBXR

(b <I)

ifR:50

{ tokell-dxBxR

(d > 1)

ifR>O

where band d are called bellefit adjustmellt parameter and damage adjustment
parameter, respectively. If the risk of loss is not positive, then the token value will

increase. The amount of increase depends on the benefit B of this transaction. As the
benefit adjustment parameter is less than 1, the increase in token is less than the
benefit. If the risk of loss is positive, the token value is decreased. The damage

adjustment parameter can be varied, depending on the expected security level of the
system. By awarding Loken conservatively with good behaviors and taking away
token aggressively with bad behaviors, a system can achieve nearly optimal decision

making.
If the token owned by an account becomes negative, the system generates an
alarm and outputs the negative token value. As the output is ordered, the higher the
fraud cost, the lower the token value. According to this order, investigators can give
priorities to their investigations.
4. Types of User Behavior
Based on three categories on fraud indicators (figure 1), we define three types
of user behaviors [18] and use them as the input in the experiments. They arc:
intentional cheating, smart repeated cheating, and unintended carelessness. In each
category, fraud indicator has a nonnal distribution, that is FI - N (J.!, a 2) with mean of

J.! and standard deviation of a.
1.0 , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

Bod

,~

0.7

]
]

Suspicious

0.4
Good

0.0 ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '

Figure 1. Categorization based on fraud indicator.
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Illtended cheating means that a user makes an attempt to cheal. The value of

fraud indicator fluctuates in the good domain without causing the system alarm, and
then suddenly moves toward bad domain. Figure 2 is an example behavior for this
model. The fraud detection engine shows the following value of fraud indicator for
the user of these 120 transactions:

Fraud Indicator =

0.85

if seqllencenumberis30

0.9

if seqllence IIll/1lbe,. is 70

0.78

if sequence 1/umber is 100

N(0.2,0.05 2 )

otherwise
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Figure 2. Intentional cheating.

Smart repeated cheating is the behavior model for a user that has repetitive
small-cost cheating actions with the intension of avoiding being caught by the fraud
detection system. The user constrains his or her actions in suspicious area and
commits no bad behaviors. Figure 3 shows an example of smart repeated cheating
type. The system shows the fraud indicator of the user behaviors has a mean of 55%
and a standard deviation of 2%.
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Figure 3. Smart repeated cheating.

Uilintended carelessness is the behavior model for a user that does not intend
to cheat. But occasionally either due to the careless of an entity or because of

limitations of the expert system, the system may indicate a little high possibility of
fraud. Figure 4 shows an example of unintended carelessness. For the 120 sequential
transactions, the fraud detection engine indicates that the fraud indicators follow:

if seqllellC:e 1/umber is31
0.55 if seqlfencellumberis62
Fraud [lldicator =
0.63 if sequencellflmberis93
0.65

N(O.2,O.OS2)

othenvise

0.'
0.'
0.'

0.'

0.'
00

40
60
80
Obsorvation SoqvOl'lCO

"0

'"

Figure 4. Unintended carelessness.
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s. Experimental Results and Evaluation
We assume that the threshold for cost-based model is 1. When a cost is above
the threshold, an alarm wiII be generated in this model. For simplicity, we assume
that each transaction has the same benefit B, which may not be true in reality.
Table 2 describes the input simulation parameters and their values_ We run the
experiment using Matlab.

Table 2 Simulation Parameters
Benefits

b

d

0.01

1.5

1.6

r

Token

0.5

0.5

Figure 5 shows the companson of the results from a cost-based decision
making model and a token-based model for the intentional cheating behavior models
of Section 3. Both models catch these anomalous behaviors and trigger alarms. There
is no time delay in our model comparing with the other.
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Figure 5. Decision making model comparison for intentional cheating.
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If someone figures out the threshold of triggering an alarm, he or she may

make smart small-cost repeated cheatings and can successfully avoid being caught
under the cost-based model. But the loken-based model will detect it, as the token
will go down the threshold and an alarm will be generated. Figure 6 shows the results
of two models for the smart repeated cheating behavior of Figure 3.
Compansoo of Alarm Generalioo Afgorithms
'5 ---~--~--~--'-;==O===il
_--0Token·based
1 --.- Cost-based

.0.5 oL_-;;o·~---·4'O·-··-- -607----~80~--,~OO~-~"O
Numbero[ Obserwlions

Figure 6. Decision making model comparison for smart repealed cheating.
Figure 7 shows token-based model can reduce false alarms under certain
conditions. For the instance of unintended carelessness type in figure 4, we will use
the entity's token to offset that entity's carelessness or shortcomings of profiling
engine. If the adjusted token value is still above threshold, an alarm will not be
generated. Cost-based model triggers two times in figure 7.

to

Comparison of Alann Generation Algorithms
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Figure 7. Decision making model comparison for unintended carelessness.
Next, we simulate each type on 1000 observation sequences. For Intentional
cheating, 97% time the fraud indicator is within good area, with 3% time in bad area.
For smart repeated cheating, the fraud indicator is within suspicious area. For
unintended-carelessness, 97% time the fraud indicator is within good area, 3% time in
suspicious area. The other parameter is the same in Table 2. We use the standard
deviation of 5%. For smart repeated cheating, as the fraudster tries to control his or
her activity, the standard deviation is less than this. We set it as 2%. Figure 8-10
shows token-based model generate a little small alarm number than cost-based model
for intentional cheating type and unintended carelessness type. However, it catches
much more in smart repeated cheating type.
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Figure 12 shows the results of two instances in Figure 11 for intentional
cheating type. The most common one is instance a, it is similar as Figure 2. Missing
alarm is still possible in token-bascd model, as shows in instance of b. However, this
will not affect the functions of the fraud detection system. As the overall benefit from
missed-alarm entities is still positive, the overall system benefit is positive. Also, as
most entities are well behaviors, missed alarms from cheating entities are quiet smalL
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There is no difference in smarl repealed cheating type as previous result.
Besides the instancc as we show before, there are two additional instances we
observed for unintended carelessness type, as show in Figure 13. Figure 14 is the
results for them. In instance a, both models tolerate suspicious activities. In instance
b, the token-based generates alann when several suspicious activities observed.
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6. Conclusion
We present a token-based model for fraud detection and prevention in realtime. By combining absolute analysis and differential analysis, we propose to use

tokens in order to save overall system cost and reduce false alarm rate without
comprising the function of fraud detection system. This model achieves almost
optimal decision-making in alarm generation. This mechanism can also cutch small-

cost repetitive fraudulent activities. The system raises alarm only when the token
associated with an entity reaches a negative value. Our experiments demonstrate that
token-based model is more appropriate for fraud detection and prevention than costbased models. This model can be easily adopted by current fraud detection systems.
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